"Eliminating
Bird Flu Fears: 10 Facts You Need to Know" by Sherry
J. Tenpenny, DO
The concerns about avian influenza,
a.k.a. bird flu, seem to have the entire world in an uproar. More
than 150 million domestic ducks and chickens have been sacrificed
throughout Southeast Asia, China, Russia and Eastern Europe in an
attempt to stop the spread of the virus. Billions of dollars are
being allocated to the development of a new “pandemic”
vaccine and the stockpiling of two drugs, Tamiflu and Relenza, which
are touted to “treat” the infection. The hysteria in
the United States has risen to the point where President George
Bush allocated resources toward preparing to use the military to
enforce quarantines and perhaps even to enforce mandatory vaccination.
What is really going on? Is a pandemic going to
develop that will stop all commerce for months and put an end to
Western civilization as we know it? (1) What tactics are being used
to scare us into believing these measures are necessary?
A level-headed examination of 10 important facts
shows that the prevailing alarmist point of view is inaccurate,
irresponsible and self-serving.
1. The
death rate from H5N1 infection is highly overstated.
Between Dec. 26, 2003 and Oct. 24, 2005, there
were 121 confirmed H5N1 infections and, of those, 62 have reportedly
died. That makes the “apparent” death rate just over
51 percent, ranking this infection among the most deadly on record.
However, thousands of mild and asymptomatic cases
are going undetected as detailed by Dick Thompson, a spokesperson
for the World Health Organization (WHO). In an interview granted
to CIDRAP (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy) News
on March 9, 2005, Thompson said that the case-fatality rate had
been overstated. Documented cases were those where the patients
were sick enough to seek medical care in a hospital and, predictably,
they had very poor outcomes. He concluded, “Surely others
were infected and either not getting sick or not getting sick enough
to seek treatment at a hospital. Factoring those into the CFR [case-fatality
rate] has been impossible. We simply don’t know the denominator.”
(2)
To illustrate, if 62 people died, but 10,000 had
actually been infected, the death rate would be 0.62 percent, essentially
insignificant. Therefore, without knowing how many are infected,
the death rate is being highly inflated
2. The
virus has barely infected humans; significantly, there has been
no sustained person-to-person transmission of the infection.
Very few cases of severe human infection by H5N1
have occurred. An intensified surveillance of patients in Southeast
Asia has led to the discovery of mild cases, more infections in
older adults, and an increased number of “clusters cases”
among family members, suggesting that “the local virus strains
may be adapting to humans.” In other words, humans are developing
their own innate resistance to the virus. (3)
In addition, all cases have occurred via animal-to-human
transmission, and there is documentation of only one confirmed case
of human-to-human transmission. Without sustained transmission between
humans — meaning one person spreads it to another and another,
and so on — there can be no pandemic. The “hype”
that, sooner or later, the H5N1 strain will mutate into a strain
that can be easily passed between humans is completely unsubstantiated.
Whether this will happen is nothing more than a guess because:
3. We
have had “potential pandemics” before.
In February 2003, Thompson of the WHO revealed
that “there have been a half dozen pandemic ‘false alarms’
in the last 30 years.” A false alarm is an outbreak where
a virus has jumped the species barrier, but has been confined to
one or two people and has not been lethal. (4)
What makes H5N1 particularly significant? Why is
this virus gaining the attention of the world? The attention may
be due not to its potentially lethal effects on humans, but rather
to the deaths of millions of domestic birds, infected or not. Could
this be about commerce? Is this a global economic crisis in the
making, but not a global health crisis?
4. Tamiflu
does not treat the flu and it is unknown if it will stop the spread
of the infection.
Clinical trials with Tamiflu have shown that the
drug reduces acute symptoms of flu by a maximum of 2.5 days, depending
on the subgroup analyzed. That’s it: 2.5 days.
In addition, viral shedding in nasal secretions was reduced after
Tamiflu had been administered. Although this would presumably lessen
the exposure risk for close contacts, this theory has not been tested.
(5)
5. The
virus is already becoming resistant to Tamiflu.
Recent human isolates are fully resistant to older,
less expensive influenza drugs, amantadine and rimantadine. (6)
In addition, a high-level of resistance to Tamiflu has been detected
in up to 16 percent of children with human influenza A (H1N1). Not
surprisingly, this resistant variant has been detected recently
in several patients with H5N1 infection who were treated with Tamiflu.
(7)
In addition, nearly seven percent of people who
are prescribed Tamiflu can’t tolerate the side effect: persistent
nausea. So, at nearly $100 for a course of treatment, you might
want to save your money and spend it on saline nasal spray, which
is at least as effective. (8)
6. The
other newly recommended drug, Relenza, isn’t much better.
Relenza is a powder, which is inhaled twice a day
for five days from a breath-activated plastic device called a Diskhaler.
Some patients have had bronchospasm (wheezing) or serious breathing
problems when they used Relenza.
In fact, in January 2000, the FDA issued a warning
about prescribing Relenza after some users reported deterioration
of respiratory function following its inhalation. Particular concern
was expressed for patients with underlying asthma or emphysema.
The FDA stated that “an acute decline in respiratory function
may contribute to a fatal outcome in patients with a complicated
pre-existing medical history and pulmonary compromise.” (9)
7. The
“seed virus” produced by the WHO and given to the vaccine
manufacturers may not be the correct virus.
In February 2005, the WHO developed several H5N1
prototype vaccine strains in accordance with the requirements of
national and international pharmaceutical licensing agencies for
influenza vaccine production. These H5N1 prototype strains were
made available to institutions and companies working to develop
the pandemic vaccines. (10)
By October 2005, the WHO had evidence that the
virus had evolved and is now “genetically distinguishable”
— i.e., different — from the prototype strain selected
for vaccine development. In what can only be described as a case
study in bureaucratic thinking, the WHO, in spite of the new information,
does not recommend changing the strain.
In any case, it will take another 4 to 18 months
before the vaccine is ready for mass dissemination. As Nancy Cox,
director of the influenza branch at the CDC (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention) stated, "If we don’t get a good
match, the vaccine will be less effective, producing illness, hospitalizations
and death." (11) By that time, will the “vaccine virus”
show any resemblance to the “pandemic virus” thought
to be in circulation then? If it is appreciably different, how can
mandatory vaccination be justified?
8. Who
benefits the most? Big Pharma.
Millions in grants and tax incentives to develop
new products. Guaranteed purchase orders from governments here and
abroad. Complete product liability protection. It doesn’t
get any better for a product manufacturer, and in this case, all
the benefits go to Chiron, Sanofi-Aventis and GlaxoSmithKline, the
“big boys” in the market for making the new vaccine.
With a global population of more than six billion, the market share
is large enough to get their attention. Add in the financial incentives,
and the developers are off and running.
To add an additional layer of protection, on Oct.
18, 2005, Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) and Senator Richard Burr (R-NC)
introduced and fast-tracked a bill that would create a new agency
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) called
the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA).
This new agency would help “spur private industry to develop
and manufacture medical countermeasures for bioterrorism agents
and natural outbreaks.”
However, the dark side of S.1873, the Biodefense
and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005, is that it
would exempt the pharmaceutical industry not only from liability,
but would also ensure that no one would have access to data documenting
medical failures or catastrophes. BARDA would be exempt from access
by the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Advisory Committee
Act and parts of the Federal Acquisition Regulations. It would act
in total secrecy and protection from the general public by the federal
government. (12)
Fortunately, the scientific community is standing
up loudly against the formation of the new agency. The Federation
of American Societies for Experimental Biology, a coalition of independent
member societies and scientists, which has historically shown particular
interest in public policy issues relating to science, weighed in
to voice several concerns. In a letter to Chairman Burr, dated Oct.
18, 2005, the coalition’s president, Bruce Bistrian, MD, PhD,
wrote the following:
“On behalf of the Federation of American
Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB), a coalition of 23 scientific
societies representing more than 65,000 scientists, I am writing
to express our reservations over your recent proposal to create
the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA)….”
“FASEB is troubled over the impact this
new agency might have on existing programs at the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control, particularly in
an era of limited funding for domestic discretionary spending. NIH
and the dozens of universities and research institutions around
the country where NIH-supported research is performed already have
the scientific expertise and research infrastructure in place to
carry out the bioterrorism research that our nation needs. Our concern
is that BARDA would duplicate, constrain or even eliminate these
programs. Moreover, while implementing a ‘top-down’
approach to research, as described in the BARDA proposal, may be
suitable for the manufacturing stage of development, we do not believe
it is an appropriate substitute for hypothesis-driven basic research,
which has historically led to the most important advances in biomedical
science.” (Emphasis added). (13)
Hopefully, other organizations and the general
public will follow suit and fight to oppose this bill.
9. Who
has the most to lose? The citizens of the world, particularly U.S.
citizens.
The Global Pandemic Preparedness Plan is nothing
more than a power grab for the government, the United Nations (UN)
and the WHO. Buried deep within the WHO’s plan, here is a
glimpse of the ominous plans in preparation for “affected
countries:”
* Activate procedures to obtain additional resources;
consider invoking emergency powers.
* Activate overarching national command and control of response
activities, either by formal means or de facto (close oversight
of district and local activities).
* Deploy operational response teams across all relevant sectors.
(14)
Global control and UN peacekeepers may be coming
soon to a neighborhood near you.
10. What
you need to do
According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the avian influenza virus is easier to destroy
than other influenza viruses. It appears that it is very sensitive
to detergents — i.e., soap — which destroy the outer
fat-containing layer of the virus. This layer is needed to enter
cells of animals and, therefore, destroys the infectivity. In other
words, when you have been in public places, use soap to wash your
hands before touching your face. (15)
Don’t get caught up in the hype. For daily
updates and developing action plans, go to www.BirdFluHype.com and
stay informed.
1. Preparing for the Next Pandemic by Michael T.
Osterholm. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005. www.foreignaffairs.org)
2. Relatives of avian flu patients have asymptomatic cases, by Robert
Roos. CIDRAP News. March 9, 2005. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/mar0905asymp.html
3. Beigel, JH. Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans. N Engl
J Med. Sept. 29, 2005;353(13):1374-85.
4. The Scientist-Online www.The-Scientist.com/news/20030227/04
5. Stiger, G. The treatment of influenza with antiviral drugs. CMAJ.
Jan. 7, 2003;168(1):49-56. PMID: 12515786
6. Li KS, Guan Y, Wang J, et al. Genesis of a highly pathogenic
and potentially pandemic H5N1 influenza virus in eastern Asia. Nature
2004;430:209-13.
7. Avian Flu Virus Showing Resistance to Tamiflu by Katrina Woznicki.
MedPageToday. Sept. 30, 2005. http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/PublicHealth/tb/1850
8. Spray used for asthma may help slow spread of infections. Asso.
Press. 11-29-04. http://www.ajc.com/news/content/health/1104/30spray.html
9. FDA Public Health Advisory. Jan. 12, 2000. http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/influenza.htm
10. WHO. Recommended H5N1 prototype strains for influenza pandemic
vaccine development remain the same. Oct. 28, 2005. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/statement_2005_10_28/en/print.html
11. Breakdowns Mar Flu Shot Program Production, distribution delays
raise fears of nation vulnerable to epidemic. SF Chronicle. Sunday,
Feb. 25, 2001.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/02/25/MN12226.DTL
12. For more information and complete version of SB 1873, go to
www.NVIC.org
13. FASEB letter. http://www.faseb.org/opa/PDF/Barda_letterhead10.18.05.pdf
14. WHO. Pandemic Preparedness Plan. p 30. http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5.pdf
15. FAO. Special report on Avian Influenza. http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/avian_qa.html
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